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CURRENT THEORY AND RESEARCH IN GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY

EDITED BY **JOHN M. BROUGHTON**
TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
AND **D. JOHN FREEMAN-MOIR**,
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11

AESTHETIC DEVELOPMENT

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The following essay aims to give an account of James Mark Baldwin's ideas concerning the aesthetic development of individuals. The topic plays an important part in Baldwin's psychology and his philosophy. No other cognitive-developmental psychologist has paid nearly as much attention to aesthetic experience as he did. One reason for this is the great scope of his ambition, which was to trace the development of mind in general, that is, of each of the modes of experience that characterizes a mature person's mentality. In his scheme, there were three major modes of experience: scientific, moral, and aesthetic. Among these three similarities and dissimilarities can be discerned.

One way to approach the subject of aesthetic experience is to consider it as a separate topic in its own right and to describe sequential stages of development within it. This is similar to what Piaget and Kohlberg have done with scientific and moral development. It is one of the approaches that Baldwin adopted, and I will give an account of his conclusions later in this essay. In addition, one can relate these stages of aesthetic development to stages in the development of the self, which for Baldwin is the central or organizing aspect of mental development as a whole. Baldwin established this relationship to stages of the self for the aesthetic as well as for the scientific and moral modes of experience, and in doing so he entwined the three strands together into one rope. This procedure again implies a parallelism between the three modes. While an account of the whole rope is well beyond the scope of the present

essay, the relation between the stages of aesthetic development and those of the cognitive core will be described later.

However, Baldwin has another and grander way of relating these three modes together, one which stresses the noncorrespondences between them and which gives to aesthetic experience a peculiar significance in his scheme. It seems best to deal with this first, albeit in a sketchy way (since it is not the primary focus of this paper). This will provide some context for the development to be discussed later and will facilitate some initial remarks about Baldwin's conception of aesthetic experience. Then there will follow a brief discussion of both the nature of aesthetic experience and its role in Baldwin's psychology, lest questions of this sort become dragons at the mouth of the cave.

I

Pancalism

Baldwin's grandest way of relating the three major modes of experience consists in a doctrine which he labels *pancalism*, a characteristic neologism which forms the motto for his *magnum opus*, *Thought and Things*. Briefly, it is the doctrine that in aesthetic experience we have a better, i.e., more comprehensive, grasp of reality than we can have in either of the other two modes. This view puts him in the great tradition of German idealist aesthetics. It can be seen, for instance, as a restatement of the central view of Schiller's *Education of Man*, though the argument for it is more psychological and less metaphysical than is Schiller's. In a very general way, Baldwin might be said to rework the conclusions of idealist aesthetics from a genetic point of view.

The argument for pancalism requires a brief statement of Baldwin's general theory of the development of mind. In the first experience of a baby, there is no dualism, no sense of mind as against matter, of values as against facts, nor, more basically, of self as against not-self. Experience is all of one kind, unmediated, nonconceptual, only of objects taken as natural. Baldwin calls this beginning phase simply *adualistic*.

Very soon, however, dualisms begin to arise within experience; a world of meanings and ideas begins to be, side by side with the world of natural objects. The creation of this symbolic world, is, by and large, the work of imagination, which detaches images from the perception of natural objects and plays with them "experimentally."

They are experienced as a question of *control*, a question as to whether the natural or the symbolic world is at any particular time in control of experience, i.e., determining its direction and character. The control of the symbolic world comes to be taken as *self*, contrasted with the control of the world of natural objects, the *not-self*. This self/not-self distinction has its own development in the individual, a development which is central to the whole development of mind, and which is discussed in detail elsewhere in this volume. The important point for our purpose is that the development of the self, and therefore, of the mind in general, requires the elaboration of dualisms. In effect, self creates itself by setting up the contrast with the not-self; mind needs a world of objects for its emergence. This is one of the great insights of the idealist tradition, though there it was usually treated as a matter of metaphysics and not of psychology.

A great deal of our experience is therefore dualistic, and both science and morality are outcomes of dualism. They both acknowledge the existence of the two worlds, the natural and the symbolic, and both are motivated by the need to resolve the tension between them. Science achieves this resolution by accepting as ultimate the control of the world of natural objects, morality, that of the world of ideas. Both resolutions are stable but partial, since they are achieved by exclusion. This exclusion is itself felt as a part of experience. The scientist can say, "This is the way the reality is." But he is aware that as a scientist, he can say nothing about how it *should* be, because, as a scientist he has already accepted the control of the natural world as arbiter of judgments of reality. The reverse is true of the moralist: he can say how the world should be, but is aware that saying so does not make it so, and that as a moralist he cannot determine how to make it so. Both, therefore, offer a grasp of reality, but one which is partial and in complementary ways. Hence, according to Baldwin, the long dispute in the history of philosophy as to which is most real, the world of natural objects or the world of ideas.

Baldwin asks: Is there a way to "overcome" the dualisms? That is, is there a mode of experience which is nondualistic, but which supercedes rather than precedes the stages of dualism? Is there a mode which is postdualistic in that it does not ignore, but rather profits from, the results of dualism and can use all the judgments which dualisms have made possible? His answer is that mature aesthetic experience does this. It can do this because an aesthetic object perfectly unites the two worlds; it is both a natural object made wholly significant, and an idea perfectly embodied in a natural object.

ence the two worlds are matched, but never perfectly so. In science, some of the features of a natural object can be explained by theory. But there are always features that escape the theory, and the theory is never perfectly exemplified by the natural object, since the theory is general and the object is particular. In morality there is an ideal which can be partially embodied in the actual world but which always transcends it, because everything actual is subject to change and decay. An aesthetic object, in contrast, is a case of complete fusion of the two worlds; an object every aspect of which is significant, and an idea wholly embodied in some natural object. Both controls therefore are allowed full play. The self can find itself fully in an aesthetic object, while at the same time all the claims of the not-self are acknowledged. Therefore it allows, according to Baldwin, maximal satisfaction of the psychological motives which led in the first place to dualism, as well as of the specific aesthetic motive. Putting it another way, there is nothing an aesthetic object cannot include in its constitution; it can include any and all of the judgments of science and morality and put them to use as its own ingredients. It creates not by exclusion but by inclusion, and so is a more comprehensive apprehension of reality.

This, briefly, is Baldwin's argument for the doctrine of *pancalism*. It is worth noting that the idea of the perfect synthesis of natural and symbolic world is at the heart of the idealist tradition and is a traditional account of the aesthetic object. There is a similar notion, for example, in Dewey's *Art as Experience*, where what he calls an *experience* refers to the felt significance of experience perfectly expressed in some material object or sequence of events. Dewey says that human experience naturally strives toward that state. Since the precepts of pancalism have already been summarized in Wallwork's chapter, I shall say no more about the doctrine here, but a number of points can now be made about Baldwin's use of the concept of aesthetic experience.

The role of the concept of aesthetic experience

The primary concept in Baldwin's philosophy and psychology is not art nor work of art; it is *aesthetic experience*. In the same way, he studies moral *experience*, rather than individual acts of morality. This, or course, is not because he is a psychologist, but because he comes from an idealist background. He takes *experience* as the most encompassing fact of human life; and he distinguishes modes of experience from one another in terms of the peculiar qualities and interests that characterize them.

that make experience aesthetic in a moment. Given this definition, or any such definition, one can thus derive the idea of *art*: anything that is an object of interest in aesthetic experience is an aesthetic object, and anything that is made deliberately to serve as an aesthetic object is a work of art. Many things can be aesthetic objects: mountains, driftwood, urinals, and so on. The complete list would include symphonies, dances, paintings, poems. The chief difference is that the latter things are likely to be more satisfactory as aesthetic objects because they are created for the purpose.

The focus on aesthetic experience is of great importance in facilitating the construction of a scheme of aesthetic development. One of its virtues is its unifying and simplifying power. There are, after all, many different arts and art media. The differences among them are very striking and obvious; what they have in common is not. In fact, it was not until the eighteenth century that music, literature, and painting were commonly grouped together as arts and distinguished from crafts and other activities. To the eye of common sense, the most important thing about an art form is the character of the medium, and most studies of children's aesthetic abilities or developmental histories have dealt with their abilities to work in a particular medium. They rarely speak of things aesthetic at all; instead, they concentrate on abilities in individual art forms. This common-sense, nontheoretical approach usually obtains results which are dubiously relevant to aesthetic concerns. (See, for example, Golomb, 1974; Moore, 1973; Gardner et al., 1972, 1975; Botvin & Sutton-Smith, 1977; Kellogg, 1969; Lowenfeld & Brittain, 1970; and DiLeo, 1970.) Even those psychologists who have thought about questions of generalizing across media (e.g. Werner & Kaplan, 1963) have thought in nonaesthetic terms, such as the generalization of the concept of a diagonal (Olson, 1970).

In contrast, Baldwin's view is that the various arts have in common the aim of producing aesthetic experience. Hence, that notion is a key organizer to get at both what is important about the arts and what is important about chidren's development in the area. Without it, one might well find stages of the development of something, but it is unlikely to have much to do with what makes art art or to generalize across the arts. We may study, for instance, the development of the ability to draw five fingers on each hand when drawing people, the ability to mix and match colors, to recognize styles, to remember tunes, or to think of many uses for a house brick. None of these abilities have centrally to do with anything aesthetic. Baldwin, as far as I know, is unique among psychologists, until very recently, in choosing to define his unit of investigation as aesthetic experience.

The concept generalizes across another set of distinctions in the same way. There are a number of different roles in connection with the arts: artist, audience member, and critic, to name a few. The differences between these roles are also very striking at first glance. They appear to consist in quite different activities, and many psychologists have assumed that they therefore call for quite different abilities. It has, for example, been argued that only the abilities of the art critic can be expected to show a cognitive-developmental character, but not those of the artist or the audience member (Gardner, 1973). This is because criticism alone seems to require "formal-operational" skills (e.g., the comparison and the relation of particulars to abstract principles). Also, many studies have dealt with children's creative abilities in different art forms, albeit studies conducted without reference to their appreciation (e.g., the strong tradition of studying the development of children's drawings in Werner & Kaplan, 1963, DiLeo, 1970, and Olson, 1970).

Baldwin's view, however—and it is part of the idealist tradition—is that these roles (artist, audience, critic) have in common what is most significant about them: they are all concerned with a particular aesthetic experience. Nor is their relationship to this experience relevantly very different. The artist as s/he creates a work must constantly look at it and respond to it, i.e., engage in the activity we would attribute to an audience member. The audience member, on the other hand, must recreate for himself the significance of the work and its parts as he perceives it, in a mental activity essentially similar (if a little more guided) to that of the artist. The critic must do the same thing; he must, perhaps, engage in the experience more fully, allowing it to come to a point of articulation and judgment. What is aesthetic about the experience, however, is what all three have in common: the act of experiencing the character and qualities of the aesthetic object.

A further benefit of the notion of aesthetic experience is that it enables one to consider responding and judging together, not as incompatible activities or as unrelated. Instead, they are both a part of experience. Aesthetic experience begins with perception, includes feeling, and moves toward explicit judgment. Nor are these different activities, but rather they are interpenetrating phases of the same activity. Judgment is already inherent in perception and in feeling; feeling is implied by judgment; and so on. For example, one sees an object as sad or lonely, as strident or exultant; this involves perception, feeling, and judgment. The same remark would be true of moral experience: to feel guilty is implicitly to judge one's act as morally wrong, and so on. It seems to follow that it would be best not to study the development of judgment alone, since stages of judgment would

also be stages of something broader (i.e., experience). This interpenetration of judgment and experience is perhaps most obvious in the case of aesthetics; but it is equally true of moral or scientific experience. In Baldwin's scheme, the units of study are scientific experience, moral experience, and aesthetic experience. All three are parallel in that they comprehend both the judgmental and the feeling sides of mental life, both cognitive and affective. This is a basic strength of cognitive-developmental psychology, and it seems to derive from this use of the notion of experience.

The Objectivity of Aesthetic Judgments

The question whether, and in what sense, aesthetic judgments can be objective is a familiar enough topic of discussion. From what has already been said, it is clear that Baldwin believes that they are objective in just the same way judgments in science and morality are objective. This is implied in the view that aesthetic experience offers a grasp of reality: if objectivity in some sense were not possible, the grasp of reality would necessarily be illusory. It seems worth explaining briefly how Baldwin thinks this process works and why it is important for psychologists.

The elements of an aesthetic object are both sensory and ideational, but they constitute a whole because they are organized. To say they are *organized* is to say they relate to each other in a way that "fits". This fittingness of the elements with each other produces a strong sense of the unity of the object and is called *form*. The internal relations of the elements of the aesthetic object are seen as complete: everything is there that is fit, and nothing that is not. The obverse of this is a sense of isolation, or unrelatedness, to things external to the object. Because the internal relations are complete, there is no need to relate the object to the surrounding circumstances. It is isolated, detached, from its surroundings, and we can attend to it by itself, for itself. In this detachment of the object from its circumstances, Baldwin believes, control passes from the external to the internal. *Internal* here has two simultaneous senses: internal to the object and internal to the person experiencing it.

On the one hand, experience is directed by the internal relations of the elements of the object, as they are actually perceived to be. These relations are taken as given, as facts which must be acknowledged. What fits or doesn't fit is not determined by whimsy, or desire, anymore than in scientific or moral judgments. Aesthetic judgments are based on the facts about the aesthetic object. There are tests and standards to eliminate idiosyncrasy in determining what is factual and relevant, just as there are in science and morality. These tests

amount to an appeal to what is phenomenally objective in perception, i.e., to whatever appears as a property of the object when closely attended to. Admittedly, such tests are rather nontechnical and may not settle close cases. But there certainly are many clear cases: for example, Picasso's *Guernica* is not, factually speaking, a happy work, nor is the fact that it is worth one million dollars relevant to its aesthetic character. So we may say that, phenomenally, *control* of the aesthetic experience lies in the character of the object.

On the other hand, the control is also, and simultaneously, in the person. The person creates the object (whether s/he is artist, perceiver, or critic) because *the sense* of fittingness and unfittingness must come from within the person, must be, as Baldwin many times puts it, "read into" the object from the inner life of the perceiver. He thinks this is obviously true, as we shall see, of any feelings "read into" the object, as well as of the form found within it. This reading in, however, is not done consciously, nor is it susceptible of deliberate control. The point is that form, in a successful aesthetic object, is both what *ought* to be (i.e., what would be most fitting) and what *is* (i.e., the factual fittingness in the object). Hence the control is dual, which is why the experience is completed by inclusion and not exclusion of any possible considerations.

Psychologically, no doubt there is an interplay in that the mind picks up suggestions from the work, develops them, and tests them out on the work again. Phenomenally, the work is experienced as suggesting or demanding some responses, refusing others. Fittingness is found in the work, and it establishes what is to be relevant. Hence, object judgments are just as possible in aesthetics as in logic or morality. The expressive character of a work of art is experienced as a character of the object, and not of the self; and therefore is experienced as being there for anyone who looks. A judgment that a poem is joyous, for example, is a judgment that everyone would find it to be joyous, *if* they read it in the right circumstances, and *if* they had the abilities to understand it and to perceive it objectively.

The qualifications in this last sentence are important. The experience is that the joyousness is there for anyone to find; it does not matter whether anyone else actually finds it. That is, the judgment is not that others *do* agree, only that they *would* agree, *if*, etc. Aesthetic judgments are again parallel to other kinds. A scientist announcing a new theory does not suppose that others do agree with him, but that they would agree with him, *if* they had the relevant evidence, the proper understanding, and followed the appropriate logic, etc. In this sense, his judgment is objective even though he continues to be a lonely voice in a scientific dispute; it is not merely a personal preference because no one else agrees with it. Baldwin's

obviously important. In the attempt to explain the growth of cognition from a Darwinist point of view, Baldwin necessarily stresses its social character. Human mentality is essentially social in that it requires interaction with others for it to be. Also, scientific, moral, and aesthetic judgments are necessarily social, because they must pass through a consensual stage in which correctness is understood as consisting in the consensus of one's society. This is necessary if one is ever to understand one's own interpretations as correctible and having any general authority. To speak this far of human sociality, however, is to speak only of how the individual comes to think like his fellows, to adopt the common view. It does not explain how society's views are themselves correctible, nor how collective mental progress and creativity are possible; and it leaves one at the mercy of various forms of relativism in all areas. Baldwin, who unlike Durkheim was determined to avoid relativism, takes the next step to be of great importance: the emergence of the ability to criticize society's views on one's own authority. This authority is not the authority of one's own idiosyncrasies (as it is before the consensual stage), but the authority of the individual's own judgment of the facts and their relations, asserted, if necessary, in spite of society's disagreement. Such a judgment is necessarily *synnomic*, or objective in the sense explained.

Baldwin, then, defends the objectivity of aesthetic judgments. It seems to me that this view is necessary if one is to have a cognitive-developmental psychology of aesthetic experience. For we are not dealing here with the development of an isolated concept, such as art or form, as the term cognitive development might suggest. We are dealing, rather, with the development of a fundamental mode of experience which, like science and morality, is essentially normative in character. A number of concepts will develop as constituent parts of this mode of experience, but it is its normative character that is its core, because this is what gives it distinctness as a "mode of experience." If it were not distinct in this way, it would not have a distinct course of development, but would instead be a part of moral or scientific, or some other, development. By *normative character* I mean that objective judgments are possible, and that various aspects of experience have inescapably a relevance or irrelevance in the making of those judgments. The same is true of Kohlberg's work on moral judgments. It is not just that the concept of rights, for example, develops; it is also that the relevance to moral judgments of the concept of rights develops. This is what makes the development of that concept a constituent part of moral development. This point saves us from a proliferation of distinct cognitive developmental schemes, each detailing the development of a concept, and enables

thinks there are three such core structures: the scientific, moral, and aesthetic. We may wish to add more; but it seems that any plausible addition must be synnomic in character.

II

The Nature of Aesthetic Experience

In this section I will describe Baldwin's account of aesthetic experience. This is necessary before discussing the different developmental levels of that experience.

It is perhaps helpful to note at the beginning that Baldwin's account of aesthetic experience (in contrast at times with his terminology) is not an idiosyncratic one. It is compatible, for example with that of Monroe Beardsley, in his *Aesthetics* (1958). No doubt this is, in part, true because of the abstract level at which he moves. But the point is important, since otherwise it would be unlikely that his account of the development of the aesthetic would be of much interest to us. In general, his account stresses, as any naturalistic theory must do, the connections between aesthetic and ordinary experience, the one being, in general, a heightening or intensification of certain features of the other.

There are four interrelated notions Baldwin uses to characterize aesthetic experience: these are *immediacy*, *semblance*, *personalization*, and *idealization*.

Immediacy

What does it mean to say aesthetic experience is *immediate*? It is perhaps easiest to define immediacy in terms of its opposite. *Mediation* occurs in experience when one thing refers (or points) to some other thing. Signs and symbols stand for some other thing, for example, and are said to mediate their meanings. Experience of a meaning via a symbol is then said to be mediate. In a purposeful experience, means often are experienced as pointing to their end. Logical deduction is also highly mediated, since each step is experienced as leading to the next. Discursive judgments in general are also mediated, since they can all be reduced to the form "A is B," in which one idea leads to another. An example may help. Consider the judgment, "trees are a renewable resource." To begin, one reads the word "trees" and thinks of the objects, trees. One does not normally attend closely to the word, to its size, for example, or its blackness on the page. One gives it sufficient attention only to recognize it and be directed to its meaning. The same is true of "renewable resource." In addition, the sentence as a whole states a judgment of the form "A is B"; in reading it we move from the first idea to the second. We make the transition, but do not attend closely to it, to the particular way it is done. Rather we attend only sufficiently to recognize the word "are" as a transition. For these reasons a normal reading of the sentence is a highly mediate experience.

This condition is the opposite of the aesthetic, where full attention is given to what is actually presented. One attends to the presented object and its qualities for their own sake and not to something beyond it. Attention is absorbed by the object, not its abstracted significance, by the present, not the future, by the means, not the end. It is undivided and nondiscursive, i.e., does not "run" from the actual to something else pointed to, and is, in short, immediate.

There are several kinds of immediate experience, as Baldwin points out. There is the immediacy of naïve sense experience, such as a baby may be presumed to have before he has a symbolic world. There is the immediacy of mysticism and of the contemplation of simple and distinct ideas, which formed the cornerstone of Cartesian philosophy. The methods of phenomenology may be thought of as aiming at immediacy in the contemplation of intentional objects of all kinds. Also there is the immediacy of aesthetic experience in its several stages of development.

Semblance

Semblance is Baldwin's word for a feature widely acknowledged as a basic characteristic of aesthetic experience. It corresponds, for instance, to what Susanne Langer (1953) means by the *virtual* character of aesthetic objects. It is the concern for the appearance rather than the reality of objects, the interest in how things look, or seem to be, rather than in what they actually are. For the sake of clarity I will mention a few simple examples of the *semblant:* a car may look fast, whether or not it is; a wall may look solid, though in fact it is about to crumble; a singer's voice may appear to be effortless, though it is not; a two-dimensional surface may appear to be three-dimensional. All these are cases of the semblant in its most general sense. They are not the only kind of case, because mental objects also can be semblantly apprehended, e.g., the idea of a square, the concept of justice, a logical connection. There are again connections here with phenomenology and hermeneutics, which were also being created contemporaneously with Baldwin. Aesthetic experience is not the only kind of semblant experience, just as it is not the only kind of immediate experience.

Buy my examples relate only to potential aesthetic objects, and I shall discuss only that case.

Baldwin's view requires that, in principle, anything can be an aesthetic object, provided only that it is capable of being apprehended through the senses. This is necessary because, as we have seen, an aesthetic object represents a perfect fusion of the world of the senses and the world of meanings. All material objects are potential aesthetic objects, as are sounds and patterns of movement. Words are perhaps a limiting case, because they may seem hardly to exist without their conventional meanings. But they are, after all, perceptible by sense, sounded, or "heard internally"; they are combined sounds and meanings, and so can become aesthetic objects. This accounts for the problems of translation in literature, for poems and novels are made of words and not of meanings. Collingwood (1938) has an interesting corollary of this point, which is that each of the arts has its origin in a specialization of body movement. This is as true of painting and drawing—specialization of hand and arm movement—as it is of speech, dance, or music. The reason is that the movements of one's own body, while certainly physical, are also the first things naturally experienced as meaningful. They are in everyone's experience at the heart of the fusion of the natural and the symbolic, the "place where two worlds meet," and are from the beginning involved in the creation of meanings. One can say then, with Collingwood, that movement is the mother of the arts. A body that did not have the power of movement at will could not have aesthetic experience, because it could not overcome the dualism of nature and meaning. Nor, presumably, could it create the dualism in the first place.

To repeat, aesthetic objects must consist in sensory materials as well as in meanings. The point is worth stressing because many idealists have seemed to deny it or ignore it; and this is at times true of Baldwin. It is also widely thought to be true of Croce and Collingwood. Baldwin sometimes speaks as if ideas alone can become aesthetic objects. Ideas certainly can be organized in different ways, and their organization is often described as harmonious, elegant, or in other ways aesthetic. We have probably all heard the claim that mathematical proofs can be beautiful. Baldwin makes this claim and says it also of the organization of a person's life, that, for example, "the development of character by the observance of moral rules is as beautiful as the progress of a musical composition" (Baldwin, 1911, p. 203).[1]

This kind of talk was common in Baldwin's time, but later

[1] All subsequent quotations from Baldwin are from *Thought and Things* (vol. 3).

writers and artists have not been sympathetic with it. The twentieth century has come to regard aesthetic objects as necessarily organizations of a sensory medium; meanings are important constituents of works of art, but they must be incorporated somehow in particular pieces of sensory material. Philosophers and artists since Baldwin's time have given much attention to the character and possibilities of organization in different sensory materials. This topic was first approached scientifically by Fechner, whose work Baldwin mentions but clearly regards as of subordinate significance. The necessity of the sensory medium, however, as we have seen, is actually required by Baldwin's own larger views, and his occasional lapses should not obscure this truth.

Semblant objects include a wider range than *aesthetic* objects, the latter being that subset of the former which is capable of being apprehended through the senses. We may then say that there is both a positive and a negative character to the attention that focuses on such objects.

On the negative side, there is what is *not* of concern, or at the center of attention, what is "bracketed." There is no attention to anything beyond the appearance. For instance, it is enough that the car *looks* fast. If one goes on to ask whether it really is fast, one's concern is no longer aesthetic but practical. The question of reality is not raised nor is it rejected as irrelevant. As Collingwood says, imagination is indifferent to, or prior to, the distinction between reality and unreality. Baldwin speaks of this negative aspect as revealing the freedom of the imagination. One is not limited to reality, as one may be in other modes. In imaginative modes one can go *beyond* it (in the sense of ignoring the facts of the matter or the practical consequences), in favor of make-believe, or as-if. The control of experience, as he puts it, passes from the external object to the self. *Semblance* reveals "the psychic tendency to consider the object as detached from the external and thus as under inner or subjective control." A simple example of this freedom is from children's play, in which a chair may easily become a horse or a space ship. More generally, this means that semblance is not resemblance. Art, for example, is not photography (though Baldwin allows that photography can be art). Where a work of art depicts something, one's interest (if it is to be aesthetic) is not in whether it is a faithful depiction of an original. One attends to the depiction, not to the original, nor to the accuracy of the reference of the depiction to the original. Otherwise it is not a case of semblant (nor, it will be noted, of immediate) experience.

On the positive side of the description of semblance, we may say that the semblant object claims attention. It is true that one may

be more—and less—fully attentive in the semblant mode itself; Baldwin makes rather a point of the inattentiveness of children's play. But in aesthetic experience, attention is fully given to the semblant object, and hence that experience is in a sense fully guided by it. However, this does not deny a more sophisticated form of the freedom and inner control just spoken of. For the semblant object is in turn created by the attention which it "claims." Attention is given only to appearance, and the object is constituted only as appearance; hence it is neither a scientific nor a practical object. Each observer must freshly create the semblant object as such for himself.

Another way to say this is to say that the observer must interpret the object *as if* it were something. An appearance must be the appearance of something, not of nothing: something must appear as if actual, that is to say, it must be an intelligible or meaningful appearance. Baldwin says: "all art . . . must mean something, must, that is, present, render or depict things, situations, events, relations, which are so far possibly real as to be understandable" (p. 158). Baldwin in any case believes that there cannot be sense-data that are wholly uninterpreted, that have no significance at all; for something to appear at all requires that it be at least minimally meaningful. Hence the idea of a "mere ink-blot" in the following sentence is to be taken as a limiting case engendered by logic, rather than as descriptive of possible experience: "The absolutely grotesque and unintelligible—the mere ink-blot, or the mere noisy crash—loses interest, whether in play or art" (p. 159).

It follows that works of art, though they must present the appearance of something, may nevertheless be what we call abstract or nonobjective. Actual blots and crashes are not ruled out, only "mere" blots and crashes. For example, an ink-blot that is pregnant with emotion is semblant, since it has the appearance of emotion. And, of course, it would be hard to find an inkblot that does not carry some suggestion of emotion. Emotions can, after all, be "presented, rendered or depicted"; and this is a fact of great importance for aesthetic experience. Its importance is such that Baldwin created for it the separate category he called "personalizing."

Personalizing

Personalizing is best regarded as a subset of the semblant. It refers to the finding in semblant objects of qualities which can be described only in terms having to do with human feeling—cases, in other words, where the semblant appearance is an appearance of feeling.

I will give some simple examples which parallel the set given in the discussion of semblance: a tree may *look* lonely, or defiant; a piece of music may *sound* sad or brooding; an inkblot may *appear* serene or joyous. The examples are similar to the first set in that they describe appearances; but they differ in that the appearances are described in terms normally used only of human feeling.

It is commonly thought that terms of this kind enable us to say what is most important about works of art. At the least, we may say, if we were not impelled to say things of this sort, art would be of considerably less interest to us than it is. It would not be heroic, or tragic, or sentimental, or emotionally involving in any way. A stronger view would be that we would have no category of the aesthetic at all. Baldwin evidently is inclined toward this stronger view; i.e., that the aesthetic necessarily has somehow to do with the presentation of human feeling. We can contrast wine-tasting: it is not an aesthetic affair on this view, although it is a matter of immediacy and of the semblant. The reason is that wine cannot sensibly be said to be sad or brooding, lonely or defiant, or describe in terms normally used of human feeling.

It may seem on second thought that it is not sensible to say that a tree looks lonely or defiant, that it is puzzling in a way that it is not puzzling to say that it looks solid. How, it might be asked, can a tree be lonely? Here one must remember that what is at issue is not the tree as a scientific object but as an *appearance*—the tree reconstituted as an aesthetic object. Loneliness is ascribed to the tree as appearance, but not to the tree as scientific object. The assertion is that the tree *looks* lonely, but not that it *is* lonely. In the same way, we mean the tree *looks* solid, not that it *is* solid, as long as we remain in the semblant mode. In both cases, we have descriptions of the way the tree looks, not of how it is. We do in fact say things of this sort all the time; such speech communicates perfectly well in normal use and does not puzzle us. The puzzle arises only on second thought, not on first. Criticism of the arts is full of such statements and they seem to be irreplaceable; that is, there seems to be no other way to say what we mean when we say that the tree looks lonely. In Baldwin's view these facts are of the greatest importance in defining the aesthetic. This makes his view a part of the expressionist view of art, according to which the essence of the aesthetic is that it expresses emotion. There has been a great deal of discussion within that tradition of just how art expresses emotion, and of what *expresses* means, and in fairness, no widely accepted answer exists.[2] It is important to see,

[2] The classic discussions are in Collingwood's *The Principles of Art* (1938), and Langer's *Feeling and Form* (1953). A useful summary and discussion of the question is in

therefore, that such questions do not have to do with whether it is true that the tree looks lonely, but with how that comes about. They are not a challenge to the fact, but rather a request for an explanation of the fact.

Characteristically, Baldwin has an explanation, and it resides in a psychological theory. It is helpful, therefore, to see that this theory, purporting to explain the expressive character of the aesthetic, is not directly involved in his description of the aesthetic as expressive, nor is it the same as his theory of the development of aesthetic experience. It is a subsidiary element within the whole, though undoubtedly an important one. His explanation depends on a theory current at his time, often known as the theory of *Einfühlung*. The root idea is this: as we attend to a work of art (visual, musical, verbal) and trace out the patterns—the risings and fallings, the stresses, conflicts, and resolutions—our body unconsciously reproduces the physical and nervous equivalents. This then gives rise to the feelings and emotions that would be felt if one were oneself going through the actions involved. Baldwin's own general account is summarized thus:

> A fruitful character of the semblant object . . . is that called in the later German literature of aesthetics, *Einfühlung* . . . It is the making of any object into a thing of semblance or "inner imitation," with the added character that such an object has a greater or less degree of subjective control attributed to it. There is a certain *feeling-into* the given object (Einfühlung) of the subject's own personal feeling: an attribution to it of the inner movement which its construction requires. (p. 166)

Baldwin was familiar with several versions of this theory, and was not quite satisfied with any. This is made clear in a footnote to the above passage, in which he says: "The great confusion that reigns in the German literature on the topic makes it seem desirable to postpone the final choice of an equivalent (for *Einfühlung*) until the concept itself is better defined" (p. 167). His own summary and use of the theory remains always at a rather general and common-sense level. He frequently speaks simply of feeling that has been "read into," "felt into" or "transferred to" an object. His use of the words "personalizing," "personification," and "identification" are similarly derived from a common-sense vocabulary. Indeed, he often seems to regard such phrases as self-justifying, as if they are simply a restatement of the facts of expression, rather than as an explanation of them. The theory of *Einfühlung* has not retained much popularity since Baldwin's time because it has remained ineradicably vague, in just this way. It does not remove much of the puzzlement surrounding the claim that "the tree looks lonely," to say that it is because the sense of loneliness has been "read into" (etc.) the tree by the

John Broughton has made the interesting suggestion that, for Baldwin, the capacity for *Einfühlung* derives from the original absence in the baby of the distinction between self and other. In the adualistic stage, there are feelings in the world, but they are not experienced as located clearly either in the self or in the not-self, since this distinction is not yet securely established. Instead, they are experienced simply as being in the one world which is all there is. This early experience is retained as a capacity through later stages, and results in both *Einfühlung* (the apprehension of feeling in objects) and as what we now call *empathy* (apprehension of feeling in other persons).

Idealization

The fourth major concept Baldwin uses to characterize the aesthetic is *idealization*. The most basic sense of this notion is organization or form. Aesthetic objects are complexly organized objects, wherein each part is somehow related to each other part and also to the whole. These relations are determined by whatever seems to be fitting (i.e., there is a relationship between any two parts whenever they seem to "fit" each other in some way). The *fit* constitutes the relationships; without fittingness there would be no forms to be apprehended. There are various kinds of *fittingness* which constitute various kinds of forms. There is, for example, the fittingness with which a premise fits a logical deduction, and that with which a particular act fits a particular moral character. I have already discussed the kind of fittingness appropriate to aesthetic objects; it is that with which sensory materials fit each other.

Experience normally is of partial forms. It is neither chaotic nor perfectly shaped. It is a matter of some elements fitting together in various ways, with other elements not being as fitting, or not fitting at all. These partial forms in experience often seem to call for their completion, to suggest something not actual. To follow these suggestions and supply the completion of "a bit of organization once begun" is to organize the data, or to *idealize* them. It is a going-beyond the factual to something felt as more fulfilling and is again a function of the freedom of the imagination. It is a deep motive of mind, to be found in all areas of experience. A well-known example is the case of perception itself. In vision, for example, there is a tendency to organize sense-data into simple shapes, a tendency which Gestalt psychologists have amply illustrated since Baldwin wrote. Baldwin himself did a number of studies of visual organization, which no doubt influenced his thinking.

Fittingness is in this way a product of mind, something read into

objects by the imagination. Nevertheless, it is not, in Baldwin's view, purely subjective. I have already discussed the sense in which judgments of fittingness are for Baldwin objective, or synnomic. The form is found, at least as a suggestion, in the object, and objects cannot be made to fit together simply by wishing, for they are experienced as accepting some forms and refusing others. The completion which fulfills the partial form of a given object is determined, or at least guided, by the given object and its partial form.

Idealization in this sense is a requisite for aesthetic experience, in Baldwin's view. He says: "Art always has its symbolic meaning, which proceeds by the further development of the motives present in the content or material. It is part of the intent of the imagination that the organization shall go forward to its consummation" (p. 205). To this is appended a footnote: "Accordingly, when we say that the lover idealizes his lady in finding her beautiful, we give the true and sufficient explanation."

Science and morality also require idealization. They both go beyond the recognition of the partial forms of normal experience to the construction of something further, and this something is nevertheless suggested by and corrected in light of the data. Science constructs hypotheses to organize belief; morality constructs practical ideals to guide our conduct. Hence science, morality, art, are alike in requiring idealization. They differ in that they hold different ends in view, namely, truth, goodness, beauty. These three words represent different kinds of completions, or organizations. *Truth*, as established by science, is an organization of hypotheses and evidence; *goodness* is an organization of means and ends. *Beauty* comes from the organization of sensory appearances. It will be clear from what has already been said that this does not preclude an organization in terms of "logical or sentimental meanings," as Baldwin would say, so long as this organization takes place in a sensory medium. In the painting of our lonely tree, for example, loneliness might be said to be the organizing principle, though what it organizes is the paint. *Idealization* in aesthetics, means that a sensory medium is so organized as to become expressive in just this way.

Of course, there are different sensory media to be organized, and there will therefore be different specific kinds of organization. As I have said, a lot of work has been done since Baldwin exploring the nature of these various possibilities (e.g. Prall, 1967). Baldwin himself is not much interested in this question; he regards it as an empirical question exactly what kind of organization a particular medium lends itself to. He says:

> The general requirement that any content, in order to become aesthetic, must be fit to be taken up in the grasps of imagination as a detached and relatively complete semblant whole, does not determine at all the actual groups of contents in this mode of experience or that, which do find themselves most fit. Each of the great types of aesthetic experience represented by what is called a "fine art"—pictorial, plastic, dramatic, literary, musical, etc.—should be experimentally investigated, and the rules of construction of the peculiar material . . . thus made out. There will thus arise a true science of aesthetics, in the sense suggested by one of the first advocates of experiment in this field, Fechner. . . . (p. 204)

However, in a general way, and before the science is done, he can indicate what kinds of organization are aesthetic, because "certain requirements have become historical in aesthetic theory: variety in unity, harmony, balance, symmetry, proportion, consistency, rhythm, movement within limits . . ." (p. 203). These are the kinds of formal arrangements that have in the past generally been found pleasing, and on which expressive qualities are based.

III

The Development of Aesthetic Experience

In Part II, I briefly described Baldwin's conception of aesthetic experience. To recapitulate, he describes aesthetic experience as experience which is immediate (i.e., finds significance in presented objects rather than in something more remote), semblant (i.e., attends to sensory appearances without further questions about reality), personalized (i.e., finds appearances expressive of feelings), and idealized (i.e., completes the formal tendencies inherent in appearances). In this section I consider Baldwin's conception of the development of aesthetic experience.

According to Baldwin there are three great levels of aesthetic development, which are related to the movements occurring in the development of mind in general. This latter development is discussed elsewhere in this book, and I can give only the briefest summary here. However, this summary, and the chart which follows, may serve the reader as a kind of map of the rest of my discussion.

There are three major levels of mental development in general, the *prelogical*, the *quasilogical*, and the *logical*. These are related to the three levels of aesthetic development, thought not in terms of a precise correspondence. The first level is adualistic in the sense already described, where the dualism between the self and the not-

self, and hence other dualisms, have not yet arisen. The child at this level is limited to perceptual and memory images, and aesthetic experience is not yet possible. This is because semblant experience is not yet possible, because the child cannot disregard the actual in order to attend to the semblant. Dualism (and the quasilogical level of mind in general) begins precisely with this ability. It consists in the ability to separate meanings and objects, and to impose one on the other consciously (but not reflectively). The general name for this ability is imagination, according to Baldwin, and the activity he calls make-believe, or *play*. It represents the first assertion of the self as against the world of not-self, and its action tends to be whimsical and arbitrary. A child may pretend a stick is at one moment a witch and at the next a horse; in this he is not significantly guided by the actual character of the stick. For this reason, though play is the first form of semblant experience, Baldwin is not willing to call it aesthetic experience, strictly speaking. One reason for this is that it is the seed, not only of aesthetic experience, but also of moral and scientific experience. Nevertheless, I include play in my exposition that follows.

The next level of aesthetic experience is also quasilogical, and occurs as the child begins to pay more attention to the object and to conceive its inner life in terms guided more closely by its form. Baldwin's name for this activity, as we have seen, is *idealization*, and it results in *spontaneous aesthetic experience*.

The last level of aesthetic experience is made possible by the capacity for *reflection*. Reflection itself is made possible by the interpretation of the self as the subject of experience, and everything else as not-self. This greatly sophisticates the mental life that has previously occurred; for example, it makes self-critical and synnomic judgments possible in all modes of experience. Hence the onset of the capacity for reflection makes possible both the general logical level of mental life, and the specific level named *reflective aesthetic experience*. These two levels are therefore contemporary as capacities in the life of an individual. Baldwin, however, because he is most concerned with the argument for *pancalism*, does not speak of them in this manner but says instead that where the general mental level is logical, the aesthetic level is postlogical. One reason for this is presumably that logical experience is mediate, and aesthetic experience immediate, and the phrase *logical aesthetic experience* would not make sense. But this cannot be all, since the use of the word "reflective" in both cases instead of "logical" would make the relation clearer. In fact, Baldwin is here, in my judgment, being misled by his system-building ambitions. Therefore, in both the chart and the exposition that follows, I have ignored the implications of the phrase *postlogical* and speak of *reflective aesthetic experience* as parallel with the level of logical mental life in general.

The three levels of aesthetic experience can be discussed in terms of three of the four characteristics already described: personalization, idealization, and immediacy. All of them are equally cases of semblance. The following, therefore, is a graphic representation of semblance. Table 1, therefore, is a graphic representation of their relationships.

columns, or its rows. I have chosen to use the columns, and will deal first with the levels of personalization, then of idealization, and, finally, of immediacy.

Table 1
Relationship between the Levels of Aesthetic Experience and the Levels of Mental Development

General Level of Mental Development	General Level of Aesthetic Development	Levels of Personalization	Levels of Idealization	Levels of Immediacy
Prelogical	None	———	———	Naive
Quasilogical	Play	Identification	———	Naive
	Spontaneous aesthetic experience	Identification	Various forms recognized but not distinguished	Naive
Logical (and postlogical)	Reflective aesthetic experience	Reflective identification	Forms of science and morality used "semblantly"	Transforming results of judgments into immediate apprehensions

Levels of Personalization: Play and Spontaneous Aesthetic Experience

Young children commonly read feelings into objects. For example, they personify dolls, tin soldiers, tools, clouds, and so on. As Baldwin says, in one of his rare examples: "A stick of wood becomes a soldier, and a lamppost a priest!" (p. 160). Baldwin in fact calls the form of personalizing at this level *personification*. This is an ordinary word for what we (including adults) do at times; but it should be clear that what Baldwin intends here is not a reflective or even a self-conscious process. He thinks that children at the earliest level have just begun to construct a conception of the not-self, and of other persons, of the location of feelings, emotions, and other human attributes. On the one hand, when children personify objects in play, they do know what they are doing in the sense that they are aware of

the animate/inanimate distinction and are not making mistakes. On the other hand, they do not have a clear sense of the interior life of other persons, and the mentality or feeling attributed to objects in play is arbitrary, discontinuous and stereotyped.

Baldwin distinguishes this from a second form of personalizing, which he calls *identification*. Identification requires a more developed conception of the interiority of others. To personify, one ascribes some form of life to the object; to identify, one imagines a mental life for the object and checks it out against one's own possible experience. Baldwin puts it thus: "in the one, we sympathize with the object as a person, and do imitatively what it seems to do; in the other, we take it up into our own life and carry its impulse forward in our own" (p. 173). The point seems to be that the second is more articulated and more emotionally involved than the first. To personify a broomstick, one treats it as alive; that is, as any form of life with any personality, however unlikely. To identify with it one tries to imagine what that personality is more exactly, and tries out, as it were, its imagined feeling structure in one's own experience. To tell how it feels, i.e., to know what personality it is, one imaginatively adopts its gestures as one's own, and imagines how one would feel in that situation. Then one reads back into the broomstick the imagined feelings as its own. There is in this process a kind of double, or reciprocal, control of experience. One's construction of the personalized object is guided by one's own feeling; at the same time one's own feeling is guided by the appearance of the object. Each provides a sort of check, or test, of the other. Hence, the process is not arbitrary, it is "serious." As Baldwin says: "The first departures from the purity of the play consciousness . . . seem to be those which modify the freedom of the personal motive and with it reduce the arbitrariness of the selected content . . ." (p. 168).

It is not clear, whether in this distinction between personifying and identifying, Baldwin is constructing technical terms and definitions (is he clear enough for that?) or elucidating ordinary language (is he too schematic for that?). Nevertheless, he seems to be describing familiar enough phenomena. It may be helpful to give a simple example of what Baldwin has in mind. Children of elementary school age do seem to identify with figures in stories, films, and TV shows. That is to say they experience (imaginatively) the hero's triumphs, his dangers as their dangers, and so on. They share vicariously his feelings, that is those feelings that appear to originate in his situation and belong to him. But these feelings, at the same time, are actually felt only by the readers, and, if we like to say so, are "read in" by them. Normally in this process the child remains aware of the distinction between reality and art, i.e., that what is happening is

fictional and that the experience involved is not actually his, but only vicariously his. He remains aware of this, although he seems unable to be reflective about the awareness. Reflectiveness, which brings with it much greater articulation and control, comes only with the third level of aesthetic development. Very young children, however, do not seem to identify in this way with fictional characters. Their reactions are not based so closely on the situations or characters in the fictions, but appear to be a good deal more arbitrary. They respond often to particular details, their attention caught in what appear to be idiosyncratic ways, guided more by whim, chance association, or memory images than by attention to the fiction as such. Another way to say this is to say that memory images often seem as important at this stage as presented visual or verbal images. A consequence is that the awareness is not clearly maintained that the emotions involved are not actually, but only vicariously, his.

There is a well-known phenomenon in response to fictions, much discussed in the aesthetics of the theater and sometimes called a *loss of distance*, in which the maintenance of this awareness is at issue. It is where, with strongly emotional and especially threatening material, we somehow respond emotionally as if no longer to fictions, but as if to reality; fear felt on behalf of the hero is suddenly felt as if on behalf of oneself, and so on. Young children can seem genuinely frightened, for example, at a routine TV crime show. Aestheticians have sometimes written as if this kind of case is not uncommon among adults and have conjured up images of yokels who clamber onto the stage to save the heroine in distress. This is portrayed then as in some way a mistake or a lack of sophistication. Baldwin's interpretation makes the adult cases implausible, but the young children's cases not so much. His scheme allows us to interpret what is involved as a regression back beyond the first stage of personalization, to the point where one does not distinguish whose feelings are at issue. Loss of distance, in other words, may be a matter of cognitive development, having to do with the grasp of a very basic distinction between the self and the not-self. It is something that cannot happen when one is operating at the first or the second level of the development of personalization.

The question arises when we talk about identifying with fictional characters how far this is similar to empathizing with actual people. The similarities appear to be strong, and the fact is relevant to the topic of the pedagogical uses of art, especially of literature. It should be noticed that Baldwin's account of the process of identifying with aesthetic objects (i.e., imagining what feeling it has by adopting its gestures, then reading the results back into the object) is very similar to his account of the process of empathizing with people,

which is discussed in Kohlberg's chapter in this book. In fact, it seems to be a more general form of the same ability. Now a developed capacity to empathize with others is important in moral experience, both because a knowledge of the feelings of others is necessary for moral judgments, and, more importantly, because the developing capacity for taking the perspective of others is thought to be requisite for the developing capacity for moral judgment. Therefore, one important question suggested by Baldwin's account is whether empathetic abilities can be fostered best or first through art. It is plausible that one's abilities to experience vicariously the feelings of others (actual or fictional) can be more finely guided and stimulated by a good novelist than by the less carefully structured interactions of social life. Many people have been convinced of the moral effects of great literature. Here is an interpretation of that conviction, which, if correct, would add exposure to approriate works of art to the instruments of the moral-development educators.

Comparison with some empirical data

Before passing on to a discussion of the third level of personalization, I would like to illustrate the nature of the first two levels with some examples drawn from research done by myself and colleagues. This requires a brief explanation of the nature of our research and its general results. I will try to say no more than is necessary for the purposes of illustration.

For some time we have been discussing a number of paintings with children and analyzing their opinions and judgments about the paintings (Parsons et al., 1979). From the data thus collected we have identified four levels of aesthetic experience that are distinguishable with high measures of interjudge reliability. This research was not based on Baldwin's work, which we did not know at the time we began, but was rather modeled as a parallel to Kohlberg's work with moral judgments. It is less general, less theoretical, and more empirical than Baldwin's work. I should add that our descriptions of levels must be regarded as tentative, since they are based not on longitudinal data, but on a cross-sectional study of 136 school students from first through twelve grades. There is certainly a good deal more research to be done before they can be taken as firmly established; some of this is continuing. Nevertheless, it may be of some interest to ask how the two schemes match.

The following chart briefly summarizes those of our results that coincide best with Baldwin's notion of personalizing, and compares our four levels of this with his three. I will call on some of the detail summarized in this chart to illustrate Baldwin's levels. As I do this, I

Table 2
Comparison of Baldwin's Levels of Personalization with Relevant Parts of Parsons' Conclusions

	Baldwin	Parsons	Level
Play (personification)	Personifies object without close attention to its actual character; basis of feeling is arbitrary.	No distinction between subjective and objective bases for feeling; idiosyncratic associations with details of the work.	1
Spontaneous aesthetic experience (identification)	Identifies with object, feeling is felt personally, but awareness maintained that it is vicarious. Cannot clearly distinguish moral from aesthetic in response.	Identifies with a main character in work; responds in terms of heroes and villains; sentimental range of feeling rejects ugly, ironic, intense, ambiguous, tragic.	2
Reflective aesthetic experience (reflective identification)	Aware of purpose of art as expressive; is reflective in seeking for emotional significance of object; clear about the "semblant" character of the moral and scientific content of a work.	Emphasis on expressiveness of art; tendency to identify with artist's feelings or to focus on own immediate affect; relates theme, form and feeling together as projecting a total attitude, but still rejects the ugly and the tragic.	3
		Discussion of artist, background, relevant only as guide to what is there; emphasis still on expressive character; but accepts the expression of any kind of feeling, including ugly, painful, tragic.	4

think it will emerge that there is a remarkably close fit; i.e., that the data, collected and organized originally without reference to Baldwin's scheme, nevertheless seem to support it. The major exception to this is that Baldwin omits our third level, which contains the possibility of a relativist view of aesthetic judgments. Another way to say this is to say that he does not distinguish between our third and fourth levels but coalesces the two into his third and last. We found the distinction between our third and fourth levels significant in large part because of the relativist issue; I will return to a discussion of Baldwin and relativism shortly.

I return to the illustration of the character of Baldwin's first two levels of personalization. We asked questions about the feelings of characters in the paintings, of the child, of the artist and of the painting considered as a whole. Baldwin's first stage of personification does not clearly appear in our transcripts, because we did not record conversations with children younger than first grade. How-

ever, we did assume it was a stage in which the feelings aroused by the paintings were very much as already described: governed by associations, memories, highly idiosyncratic, not always apparently relevant to the painting, and not firmly located in either self or in the painting. I will give an example, from a discussion with a 5½-year-old boy of a reproduction of Currier and Ives' "Preparing for Market," a rather detailed scene of farm life. He volunteered that he liked the painting very much, and when asked why, he said it was because it reminded him of his cowboy hat. There are no cowboy hats in the picture and no cowboys. It seemed that he was reminded of his hat by the horse in the picture, and that what he was reminded of was quite as relevant and important a part of the experience as what he actually saw. And in the context it seemed clear that he did not distinguish between what he thought of and what he saw; these were not two elements of the experience for him. The pleasure of thinking about the hat was all one with the pleasure of seeing the painting, because the thinking was all one with the seeing.

We have many examples of Baldwin's second stage, identification. We found children at this stage tend to focus on particular characters in the painting one at a time and attribute feelings to them. In so doing they are guided principally by the general subject matter rather than by the particular expressiveness of the painting. This distinction is not as difficult to make as it might seem. In explaining their interpretations, children at this level did not refer to the way the painting was done (to the gestures of persons or objects, to the use of color for expressiveness, etc.); they referred instead to what the painting was about. That is to say, they tend to use stereotypes about how people feel, and to assume that others have motives and responses similar to what their own would be. For example, a child's response might run thus: This is about a circus; people enjoy watching circuses; the feeling is one of enjoyment. Our research in general substantiated the view that children of this age are dominated by subject matter, i.e., what the painting is about, rather than how it is done. And the most important point seems to be this: if asked how the painting makes them feel, they usually described a feeling already attributed to a character in the painting, and did not distinguish their own feeling as different or problematic. Two simple examples:

Q. What kind of feeling would you say is in this painting?
A. Hatred.
Q. Why's that?
A. Because they are fighting.
Q. Is that the main feeling or are there other feelings?
A. I think that's the only one.
Q. What feeling do you get when you look at this painting?
A. The feeling of hatred, like out to kill. (Girl, 4th grade)

* * *

Q. What kind of feeling would you say is in this painting?
A. People are having fun.
Q. What feeling do you get when you look at this painting?
A. Like the people in the background are enjoying the show, and the food that they are eating. (Girl, 4th grade)

Levels of Personalization: Reflective Aesthetic Experience

According to Baldwin, the third level of mental development is marked by the capacity for reflection. When the self is understood as the subject of experience, and experience as its object, then experience itself becomes available for scrutiny and analysis. One can describe, distinguish, ponder, question, different aspects of experience. This makes possible greater clarity about the kinds and motives of experience, and the nature of different kinds of judgments. It also brings greater awareness of the limitations and possible biases in judgments.

The advent of reflectivity is of great importance in all areas of development, and not least in connection with aesthetic experience. Baldwin's discussion of how it affects personalization is short but pithy:

> There is an identification of the self with the aesthetic object in all enjoyment of art; and so far from finding this process losing force when the elements of the self become more refined and reflective, we find, on the contrary, a new willingness to go with the thing and submit to the illusion of unity with it. The intent to identify the self with the movements suggested by the work of art becomes a more or less conscious part of the aesthetic effect. We seek for analogies from life and mind to justify what we feel, and for symbols to make concrete the meaning of inner control taken over from the thing . . . (p. 191)

The ability to reflect on experience brings a new understanding of the purpose and nature of art. Most of the adolescent and many of the preadolescent students in our research were clear about the expressive nature of art. They had come to see it as a matter either of "expressing feelings," or as "conveying messages," in either case having meanings which would be hard to put into words. And, as Baldwin says, the new understanding was in general welcomed and the expressiveness of art explored. Art for many of our adolescent

subjects was primarily a matter of exploring oneself, by finding out what range of feelings appealed to one, and what kinds of emotion were possible. Getting this expressive function clearer meant also getting clearer what art is not: abandoning the view, for instance, that it is a matter of representing actual appearances faithfully. Most of the "rules" guiding judgment previously are discarded, often very gradually; a wider range of subject matter is acceptable. Some of these points I return to under the topic of idealization, for the two topics cannot always be kept quite separate.

We also identified three features of response at this level that perhaps can be seen as corollaries of Baldwin's central point, i.e., the new awareness of the expressive nature of art. The first is a greater awareness of complexity and varying nuances of feeling, along with an increased tolerance of, even a seeking for, ambiguity of feeling in both self and painting. The exact character of one's emotive response to a painting often was of great interest, and there was acknowledgement of the possibility of different responses of different individuals to the same work. This rests on an awareness of the distinction between one's own feeling and that of characters in the painting, which was missing at the previous level.

The second corollary is an awareness of the importance of the medium, style, and composition of the work, in addition to that of the subject matter per se. There is an awareness that the same subject may express different sets of feelings, depending on the particular way it is treated, and the treatment therefore requires more attention. Another way of putting this is to say that for the first time there is an ability to distinguish the appeal of the matter represented from the appeal of the representation. This allows one to say that the choice of a beautiful subject, e.g., a beautiful woman, does not guarantee a beautiful painting, and, vice versa, that an unappealing subject might nevertheless be used in an appealing painting.

The third point is an awareness that the artist had choices in the creation of the painting, because s/he was not simply capturing the appearances of some object. His/her conceptions, feelings, or intentions therefore become of some interest, and many of our adolescent subjects fastened on this as a way of discussing the painting in general. For some, the artist's intentions were used as a criterion for deciding the significance of a painting or the rightness of different interpretations.

These points are taken from the results of our research, but are suggested by Baldwin's brief remarks. A great deal more detail could be offered, but I will content myself with one example that illustrates what I have said. It is from a discussion of Picasso's "Guernica" with a 16-year-old boy.

Q. What kinds of feeling are there in the painting?
A. Well, there's like panic and pain, a lot of confusion. You can see it, in this painting, like you have to use your imagination, and I guess that's good. I don't know, though, I think myself I like pictures that are lifelike, that you can—but this is good though, I can see that. You have to use your imagination to see feelings.
Q. What do you mean by lifelike?
A. Well, I like things that look like a tree and things that look like a person . . .
Q. Do you think this would be better if it were more realistic?
A. Well, not necessarily. Like, not for this type of painting. Well, in this painting what's important is, he gets his idea across and you understand what's going on, like the pain and the suffering and everything that goes along with a bombing. He doesn't need to have everything drawn out perfect and identical to what the real thing looks like.
Q. You'd say there are strong feelings in the painting?
A. Yeah. I imagine that,—well, it seems like the artist knew what he was painting about. He was actually, like, in a bombing, or his family or close friends of his got killed in a bombing . . .
Q. How would you rate the painting?
A. Well, yeah, I like it. I imagine it's—well, it's not so important how I feel about it because I'm sure that artist was really happy with his work. And, well, it makes you think.
Q. Why isn't it important how you feel about it?
A. Well, it's just that when an artist is painting a picture, he should just mostly be doing it just because he likes to; it's just like an outlet, like he wants to get it out of his system. And when you look at it you have to think and use your imagination. It gets you to thinking about how it's like. It's like everybody can see this picture and they can see different things in it. Not like in a nature scene that's painted perfectly—in this everyone sees it differently and they can think of their own experiences and it lets the person use their own imagination . . .

I think it can be seen that the reference to the artist's feelings or intentions can easily lead one into a kind of relativism. One could say, for instance, that if the artist got his feelings "out of his system" it is a good work of art, or if he got his message across, or carried out his intentions. Usually our subjects (as in the preceding extract) would go on to conclude that their own response was, therefore, irrelevant, because at best only the artist could tell whether this criterion had been met. There is in the philosophy of criticism a famous discussion of the issues, whether the artist's intentions are relevant to either interpretation or evaluation of works of art, and whether they are accessible to anyone but the artist (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1946; see also Beardsley, 1958). A summary of the discussion would be too long here, but it seems that the artist's feelings or intentions can be relevant only if they are somehow determinable *via* the work of art, and not only *via* private knowledge. The important point here, I think, is that, for adolescents, to discuss the artist's intentions is to be tempted (at least) to relativist views.

An alternative route to relativism, which is simply the obverse of the above, and which we also observed, is to assert that only the viewer's response is relevant. If there are two interpretations or judgments, then both are equally valid, each for the respective viewers. Our research convinces us that relativism of these naive sorts is unquestionably a temptation, and often an actuality, at this level.

The topic is important because the possibility of relativism with respect to aesthetic judgments does not arise in Baldwin's discussion. He is philosophically against all forms of relativism and emotivism, and, as I have pointed out, regards aesthetic judgments as synnomic or objective in character. He thinks, as we do, that at the last level, there is an appeal in support of judgments to the publicly available features of the object, i.e., to whatever is apprehended as open for any one to see, *if* they are in the right circumstances, etc. It is not that one's own experience of the object is discounted as evidence at this level; quite the contrary, for it is the only final arbiter of judgments (the same is true of science and morality). It is rather that the distinction is finally clear within experience itself between those elements that are idiosyncratic (personal associations, memories) and those that are relevant responses to actual features of the objects. These actual features include, of course, such things as the appearance of loneliness of the tree or of panic and pain in Picasso's "Guernica."

We did not get data clearly belonging to this last level in our research, both because we did not interview persons beyond 12th grade and because at that time our questions did not attain the precision necessary to be sure of the distinctions. There is a sense, in any case, in which the mapping of this last level is the traditional concern of the philosophy of criticism, since one would expect critics to have mostly attained maturity of aesthetic experience. We rely, therefore at least temporarily, on the results of such work as Beardsley's (1958).

The parallel with Kohlberg's account of the development of moral judgment is striking in connection with this topic of relativism. There is in both a level at which people use rules for judgment, and a point at which they move beyond them. In confronting the inadequacy of the rules, they confront also the possibility of relativism, which sometimes does and sometimes does not become overtly articulated. Nevertheless, there is a final movement beyond this to a recognition of some kind of principle, in our case, to the principle that evidence relates to features of the work which anyone could see, etc. Baldwin's account, to repeat, collapses these two levels into one.

Levels of Idealization: Play and Spontaneous Aesthetic Experience

The first level, called *play* by Baldwin, is controlled as much by association as by perception, attention is not (according to him) characterized by idealization, because it is not clearly focused on the appearance of the object, and hence there is no sense of form emerging from that appearance. Play is arbitrary, disjointed, idiosyncratic. As Baldwin says: "Any old thing will do to play with, and any old purpose may be played out upon it" (p. 171). Furthermore, "in play the situation may be developed and extended *ad libitum* as long as the impulse to play continues. The dramatization may run out in this direction or that, knowing no limitation or rule, and seeming to have no ideal, no growing form" (p. 201).

Because it is not idealized, Baldwin chose not to regard play as a stage of aesthetic experience at all. He chose to call it a precursor, but not an early form, of aesthetic experience. This is an intelligible decision in light of what has been said, but it seems to me an unfortunate one. Any developmental scheme must raise the question: At what point does experience become aesthetic, or moral, etc.? This question is largely a question of choice rather than of fact, because it is really the question: At what point shall we choose to call experience aesthetic, moral, etc? And it seems to me that, given any scheme of continuities and discontinuities such as we find in Baldwin or Kohlberg, it is better, because more generous, to choose not to say the young child is unaesthetic or nonmoral. I would rather say that from the beginning, though in a limited way, the child is a citizen of the realm of aesthetics, in that objects do have from the beginning an appeal by virtue of their appearances.

The beginning of idealization transforms play into *spontaneous aesthetic experience*, according to Baldwin. It brings principles of relevance, tests that can be made, the possibility of making judgments. Spontaneous aesthetic experience is more serious, because there is a sense of fittingness, and the freedom of caprice disappears.

The consequence is that the first effects of idealization are described by Baldwin largely as restraints. Play, in its movement from reality, creates freedom from reality; idealization brings it back for testing. That is to say, the meaning created by the imagination is now referred back to the natural world. This is another way of saying there is a closer attention to the character of actual objects. This "experimental meaning" is the origin of scientific experiment and moral concern, as well as of aesthetic judgment. It follows that idealization is possible only when the individual has reached a dualistic stage in his/her general cognitive development (i.e., has achieved some version of the distinction between self and not-self).

because it entails this ability to test ideas, i.e., to compare some symbolic or imaginative creation with the natural world. Baldwin does not discuss just which version of dualistic experience is necessary, except, of course, that the individual has not yet achieved the "reflective" distinction between subject and object. Hence, the stage of spontaneous aesthetic experience must be understood to span a rather long period.

In his discussion of the restraints that the "testing" of idealization brings with it, Baldwin does not deal with the organization of the sensory medium as such; i.e., with what might be called formal aesthetic concerns, such as symmetry, balance, contrast, etc. This is also true of his discussion of the reflective level of idealization, and I will discuss the point in that connection. Meantime, what he does focus on are the tests of truth and morality, which he asserts are both present in aesthetic experience. They are not actually employed, but are experienced as if employed, as semblant tests. There is, he says, "when play gives place to art, the assumption of the common verification, as if it were secured." The full passage reads:

> I may play as I please, only my whim setting limits to my freedom; I may see hob-goblins in my tobacco smoke, and ask you to play with me that they are there. But I cannot . . . call anything I please beautiful. To do so, we must distinguish the shapes of hob-goblins, and reach some sort of agreement as to their beauty. This agreement is not that reached . . . through experimental tests . . . but the semblance of such testing is present. I must at least be willing to appeal to you, suggesting, if not requiring, that you agree with me in the result of my idealization . . . there is, when play gives place to art, the assumption of common verification, as if it were secured. (p. 171)

I shall try to illustrate what he means. As a brief summary, I give a comparison chart of levels of idealization, similar to that of personalizing.

First, I will speak of the test of *truth*. Together with the tendency for children at this level to focus on subject matter, and to ignore the medium and its peculiarities, goes a growing demand for realistic presentation, at least in American culture. Increasingly in the elementary school years, paintings are judged in terms of how well they represent the appearance of objects in the world, i.e., how realistic or accurate they are in presenting their subject matter. This is a kind of truth test, i.e., truth with respect to the facts of appearances; and requires the ability to make an implicit comparison of the painting with its subject in reality. It demonstrates, too, a degree of decentering, i.e., an increased ability to consider the appearance of paintings and objects as others would see them.

Our research is full of examples of this, and we were able to distinguish two sublevels. First a child will ask that things "look

Table 3
Comparison of Baldwin's Levels of Idealization with Relevant Parts of Parsons' Conclusions

	Baldwin	Parsons
Play	No idealization; response is whimsical and idiosyncratic; no possibility of judgment.	The appeal of the art object is located in an egocentrically close self-object relation— i.e., that of liking it ("my favorite"). Hence there is no distinction between liking and judging. No distinction between subject and "treatment"; art not clearly distinguished from other objects; little sense of form, unity or theme.
Spontaneous aesthetic experience (idealization)	Possibility of objective judgment through us of tests of truth and morality. "Semblant" character if tests not brought to reflection.	Appeal is conceived as the satisfaction of (often unarticulated) rules such as: it is skillfully made, it required hard work, it is well arranged it is realistic, it is appropriate aesthetic subject; conventional view of what subjects are suitable for art; little sense of character of medium.
Reflective aesthetic experience (reflective idealization)	Reflective awareness of "semblant" character of tests allows dropping inappropriate rules, such as realism.	Criteria determined in terms either of artist's intentions or of viewer's feelings; possibility of relativism, values originality, strong feeling (distinguishes aesthetic from moral judgments); aware of alternative styles and formal approaches, speaks of genres, kinds; aware of medium and its character; distinguishes appeal of subject matter from beauty of treatment, relates parts to whole, and style and form to theme. Judgment based on qualities of the work that are in principle public and are based on perceptual or intentional aspects of it; criteria formulated in terms of work itself, open to revision through discussion and trial; strong emphasis on form and complex qualities; subject matter related to this; any subject could be suitable for art, depending on treatment.

real," or as they are "supposed to," that they are readily identifiable and comprehended, and that they do not defy what everyone knows to be the case. We called this *schematic realism*. It changes slowly into the next substage, which we called *photographic realism*. In this latter the test is more precise: that what is represented be the visual appearance of objects, rather than just what everyone knows about them. This can be illustrated from discussions of Picasso's "Weeping Woman." The younger children objected to the placement of two eyes on one side of the face, and the fact that the eyes looked like "boats." Yet they did not object to the hands, which, though considerably contorted, have five fingers, and on each a fingernail. Some would count the fingers to make sure (the first one counted wrong):

Q. Is this the way you'd expect a painting of a weeping woman to be painted?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. When someone cries that's not how he looks. The other eye is supposed to be over here, not there.
Q. What do you think the artist should have done differently?
A. Put the eye over here, put another finger on that hand. (Boy, 2nd grade)

Q. What about the eyes?
A. They're weird and they shouldn't both be on the same side.
Q. What about the hands?
A. They're okay.
Q. Do you think the artist should have done them any differently?
A. No, they're okay. (Boy, 2nd grade)

Older students began to object to the hands as well. Although the hands had five fingers and fingernails, they weren't enough like "real" hands (i.e., weren't photographically correct):

Q. What about the hands?
A. They're weird.
Q. Is there anything he should have done differently?
A. Made the hands look like real hands. (Girl, 6th grade)

Q. What about how he made the hands?
A. The fingers are weird cause they don't go like a real hand. (Girl, 6th grade)

These criteria of realism are retained at more articulate levels (in discussing) Bellow's "Firpo and Dempsey":

Q. Would you say that you like this painting or you don't like this painting?
A. I like this one a lot because I like boxing, and I like the way they made these guys, showing their muscles so it looks real.
Would you [illegible]

A. Yeah, because their faces, they look real. They've got shading in them and he knows how to draw faces and bodies well. (Girl, 7th grade)

Similarly, the chief criterion of color becomes its appropriateness. Earlier, children like colorfulness for its own sake, choose bright, strong colors, and think, in effect, the more colors the better. However, in this quasilogical stage, *realism* of color becomes more important. To the question, "What makes these colors good?" typical responses are:

Cause there's dogs that color and dresses that color.

Cause when you look at a real person like that you think that's what it would look like.

Well, you know, it's just like if it wasn't a painting it would really look like that.

Similarly, the conception of artistic ability, what it takes to paint a good painting, covers such items as manual skill, perseverance in getting it right, patience, hard work. Time is also frequently mentioned. It is assumed that the harder a painting is to do, the better it is. This amounts to admiration for craftsmanship, which has often been thought to be the beginning of aesthetic appreciation.

Q. Why would this painting be hard?
A. They'd have to try really hard to get the drawing right and it might take a month to draw one thing. (Girl, 4th grade)

Q. What does it take to paint a painting like this?
A. It takes time and you really have to work at it. (Boy, 2nd grade)

Q. Which do you think would be the hardest painting to paint?
A. The first (Renoir) because it would be hard to get the colors in it and it has a lot of details. (Girl, 6th grade)

Q. Would the Renoir be harder or easier than the Klee?
A. Harder because it has more things in it and it's real. (Boy, 5th grade)

These cases illustrate Baldwin's contention that during the stage of spontaneous aesthetic experience judgments about truth are an integral part of the response. They are, however, used only semblantly. Judgments are made about representations as if they were reality, but the child remains quite aware that they are not reality. The spontaneous aesthetic experience is not a delusion, or illusion. It is always experience of something "as if," and although the child focuses on the object represented and not on the medium, he remains aware that it is a representation. A good illustration is the fact that most children have no difficulties with fantasy, such as is found in TV animation or in comic book heroes and monsters. There is often a curious mixture of the demand for realism with the acceptance of the fantastic that I do not know how to describe in general. For example,

figure *Hulk* is drawn, and found no demur over his wildly unrealistic characteristics. Baldwin himself speaks of "hobgoblins," about which nevertheless agreement can be sought.

On the other hand, although there is a sure awareness of the semblant character of these tests, the awareness is not a reflective but a spontaneous one. This means that the criteria being applied (e.g., realistic appearance) do not seem to be reflectively chosen; there is no thought that they need to be justified, but are taken as obvious. Moreover, though the judgment is taken to be one that others would agree with—and hence is "objective"—it is not considered so much a matter of individual judgment as of common acceptance. There is frequently felt to be no need to give reasons, because both the facts and the criteria can be taken for granted. Also, the kinds of criteria for different kinds of judgments are not distinguished. For example, scientific illustrations are judged in the same way that art drawings are judged. The scientific, the moral, and the aesthetic are not clearly distinguished as concerns, and so aesthetic judgments will be based on a mixture, or confusion, of different kinds of reasons. Getting clear about these differences requires raising them to reflection, and therefore, waits until the next level of aesthetic experience.

These remarks apply also to the other kind of test incorporated into spontaneous aesthetic experience—the practical or moral. The moral opinions of the child at this level are often the basis of judgments made within aesthetic experience, and constitute restrictions on what can be accepted aesthetically. This is most obvious in connection with narrative in literature and film. There is a demand for "goodies and baddies", i.e., a clear delineation between the heroes and the villains in moral terms. Moral ambiguity, especially on the part of the hero, is not well received. In addition, the demands for stereotyping go beyond the moral into a penumbra of personal attractiveness, from which the moral is not distinguished. Thus children's narrative heroes are usually good-looking, or strong, or unusually brave, or clever in some way, often in combination. The chief alternative to this is where the hero is a colorless character, designed largely for easy identification on the part of the reader; a good example would be Jim in *Treasure Island*.

These points, with respect to moral judgments, can also be illustrated from our research on children's responses to paintings. Again, we found two substages of what Baldwin has in mind. In the first, the child takes it for granted that paintings should be about pleasant and interesting things, and should avoid unpleasantness of all kinds. Concepts of pleasantness and unpleasantness are highly stereotyped. For example:

Q. Is this a good thing to paint a painting about?
A. Not that good.
Q. What do you think artists should paint about?
A. The ocean and trees and pretty things. (Boy, 2nd grade)

Q. Is this the kind of thing you'd expect an artist to paint about?
A. No, cause I sometimes look at sad paintings and I get tears in my eyes, and I just want things to come out all right. I don't like sad things.
Q. Is it good to paint about things that are sad?
A. No, I like paintings to be nice and not about sad things. (Boy, 3rd grade)

At the second substage, the range of subject thought suitable expands to include sad, nostalgic, and unpleasant matters. However, violent, cruel, or tragic themes are still rejected. For example:

Q. Is this a good thing to paint about, a girl and a dog?
A. Yeah.
Q. Why?
A. Cause, I like animals.
Q. It's good to paint about animals?
A. Yeah.
Q. What if this were a sad painting about an animal, like a dog was hurt or something bad had happened to him? Would that be a good thing to paint about?
A. Yeah, cause it would show that dogs get hurt—it would show that animals get hurt.
Q. What if it were about something mean, like someone being mean to an animal?
A. I wouldn't like that.
Q. Would that be a good thing to paint about?
A. I don't think so. (Boy, 5th grade)

Q. Is boxing the kind of subject that you would expect people to paint about?
A. No, because it's portraying violence and I don't think many people like that. (Girl, 10th grade)

Q. Is this the kind of thing you'd expect an artist to paint about?
A. Sort of, but not this way, because people don't like to look at it. This is a sad picture, they look at it, not as something to relate to but they look at the parts all mangled, and people don't want to look at that. When parts of the body are missing people don't like to keep that in their mind. Most war pictures are painted about people who have just been shot and are laying on the ground, but this painting has people all in different pieces and it's not how most war paintings would be painted. (Boy, 10th grade)

Levels of Idealization: Reflective Aesthetic Judgment

As we have already seen, the last level begins when the individual understands the self as the subject of its experience, and

experience thereby becomes the object about which the subject can reflect. Previously one had been able to think about things and problems; now one can think about experience itself, and the concepts, feelings, and judgments which are part of it. Hence, one can become more aware of the differences between kinds of judgments, and the criteria that are relevant to them. One main result of this reflectivity is a release from the restrictions that the previous level imposed.

At the spontaneous level, judgments of truth and moral worth were incorporated into aesthetic judgments unreflectively, and the effect was restrictive. For example, elementary school children constructed a number of rules for judgment, including the rule of realism and rejected art works that did not conform. Similarly, they rejected certain subject matters on moral grounds. The new awareness of kinds of judgments means that these restrictions can be dropped where they are irrelevant, and there can be much more flexibility about criteria of excellence.

To illustrate, in our research we found a level where the demand for realism was dropped, except in cases where a painting seemed to require it. Otherwise, there was acceptance of various degrees of abstraction and distortion. There was a much greater awareness of a variety of styles of painting, of intentions of the artist, and of possible responses of the viewer. It was not that the idea of a "test for truth" was dropped; it was rather that the validity of multiple possible sets of criteria was acknowledged, and the question often became how to determine which set of criteria to apply. Some responses to Picasso's "Guernica" that seem to illustrate this development are:

Q. Would this be a better painting if it were more realistic?
A. I think it is better the way it is, abstract, or even more so, in a way. This relates to the total confusion of the situation. (Boy, 12th grade)

Q. Would this be a better painting if it were more realistic?
A. No, I don't think so. If he's trying to show his feelings and if this is what his feelings are then this is the way the painting should be. (Girl, 10th grade)

Q. Would this be a better painting if it were more realistic?
A. I don't think so, because photographs will capture action but I think the artist tried to go inside of the action, and I think a simple photograph or reproducing it on a painting just reduces the effect of what this tries to do. (Boy, 12th grade)

The same thing is true of judgments of moral worth. They are dropped from aesthetic experience where they are inappropriate. Where they are not, they are understood as semblant judgments and

apprehended as qualities of the work itself. Several of our older subjects, for example, responded to the felt quality of moral outrage at modern war in Picasso's "Guernica," though they did not always express this well. Their comments certainly contrast with the earlier rejection of the painting because its subject was unpleasant:

Q. Do you like this painting?
A. I like it because wars are sometimes necessary. I think there are other ways to solve things, I think since I was born I can remember war going on with one country or another and it is a fact and I would buy it because it represents it and the people. (Girl, 12th grade)

Q. Is war the kind of subject that you would expect people to paint about?
A. I think war is a real life situation, war is one of the largest events in history. When they write about history books, one of the main things is war, which tells a lot about the whole world situation. It's not necessarily a good topic but one that many artists would be concerned with. (Boy, 12th grade)

Q. Is this the kind of thing you'd expect an artist to paint about?
Q. Yeah, for someone who has lived through an experience. I wouldn't expect someone who has read about it, but for someone who was in the town and for him to come out and to paint something like this, I wouldn't think him off his rocker because in an abstract way it's captured all the feelings and expressions and things that went on in that time. (Boy, 11th grade)

Another way of describing this change is to say that, because the nature of scientific and moral judgments is clearer, these judgments can be more easily distinguished from aesthetic judgments. Art comes to be seen as having its own purposes and concerns. This is no longer information giving nor edification, but the expression of emotion. Hence a much wider emotional range is acceptable. Various kinds of doubts and insufficiencies are allowed in one's heroes, and tragedy is possible. Similarly, there is greater openness to the art of other cultures and traditions, since one no longer confuses appreciating a work with an acceptance of whatever doctrines or attitudes it contains, as actually true or worthwhile.

One rather obvious omission in Baldwin's discussion of this level must be mentioned: the greater interest in the art form itself, understood as a sensory medium that can be worked with. Baldwin, as we have seen, stresses the ideational and feelingful aspects of organization in aesthetic objects, and the clarity regarding them that reflection brings. But the most basic and obvious sense of organization in the arts refers to the *medium*, the physical stuff the object is made from. In this connection too, we found a change. The medium is no longer "transparent," to be looked through in search of the subject matter. It is now understood as the proper focus of attention. A

painting of a cabbage can be as significant as that of a king, and the difference is understood to be largely in the treatment of the medium. There is more interest in purely sensory matters; for example, colors are no longer stereotyped under their class names as reds, blues, browns, and so on. Textures are attended to; questions of arrangement are raised and alternative possibilities pondered. There is awareness of different styles, and a style comes to be seen as itself an achievement. There is a fascination with the question of what can be done with various media and an interest in experimenting with techniques. The result is greater attention to the actual individual character of the particular surface of the aesthetic object, and this change would loom large in a purely descriptive account of this last level.

The reason that Baldwin ignores this aspect of idealization is presumably that his interest, in *Thought and Things* and in *Genetic Theory of Reality*, is primarily to argue the case for pancalism. Hence he spends his time discussing the "logical and sentimental" judgments that get incorporated into the organization of aesthetic objects. But there is nothing in his discussion that prohibits the addition of this part of the development of idealization.

Levels of Immediacy

There may still be a question, however, regarding the notion of immediacy, which the reader will remember is Baldwin's fourth and last defining characteristic of the aesthetic. *How* can logical and practical judgments be incorporated into aesthetic experience? Judgments, Baldwin has said, are necessarily affairs of mediation; the aesthetic is necessarily immediate. Is there a contradiction here? Putting it another way, when the self-consciously judgmental level of reflection is reached, why is aesthetic experience not left behind, as a sort of primitive version of mentality? The answer is that just as one can, in any situation, move from immediate experience to mediated, so one can return from mediated experience to immediate. The return, however, is richer than the departure, because it can incorporate the judgments achieved in the second phase. The phenomenon is neither mysterious nor unusual. To give an oversimplified example suppose one parks at night in an empty parking lot behind a rundown hotel in the middle of Denver, as I did recently. One might be struck by the emptiness, the strange light, the silence. This is an initial, relatively unreflected upon, immediate experience. Then one looks around and makes some judgments: there are few cars, although it is a parking lot; the insufficient electric lighting creates the strange light; the character of a lot like this is determined

by the economic conditions of poverty. These are discursive mediated propositions that make connections and lead attention from one item to another. Then one can move back to an immediate apprehension of the parking lot at night, to savor again its peculiar quality: its strong sense of loneliness, of being an alien, inhospitable terrain. This quality is again *had* immediately, without intervention of judgments, but this time more richly because of the context of judgments. The judgments can be retained not as discursive items of information, but as ingredient in the qualities appearing. The light *looks like* poor electric lighting; the area *looks* poor and socially deteriorated. Then these are no longer only items one knows but qualities one sees.

The example is a commonplace one, meant to make the point that this sort of thing happens all the time. Dewey called it the *funding* of immediate experience. The difficulty with the example is not so much its triviality, as that it seems to suggest that there is an initial immediate experience which is unfunded. This is never true, just because it is happening all the time. Even our simplest perceptions include a funding by previous judgments; for example, a stone looks heavy because we have experienced heavy objects before. We could say experience is never logically immediate, though it often is so phenomenally.

Baldwin is concerned with this feature of experience, because of his interest in the role of scientific and moral judgments in the reflective stage of aesthetic experience. He concludes that aesthetic experience can ingest judgments of all kinds to its own benefit and without losing its immediacy. Two kinds of art that could be used to illustrate his point are science fiction and religious poetry. In science fiction it is important that the situations be convincing; although they are explicitly not in the real world, they must at least seem to be in a possible world. Many kinds of overt calculation and judgment may go into writing such a novel, or reading it; they will be relevant to an appreciation where they can fund experience. That is to say, they will be helpful where they produce an immediate sense that the situation is scientifically possible. Scientific judgments then work to enhance the aesthetic object. It follows that the theories and calculations in such a novel do not have to be scientifically sound; they have only to appear to be so.

The same holds true of religious poetry. It may help aesthetically to make judgments concerning the poet's actual devoutness, or his religious orthodoxy; but it helps only if these judgments fund subsequent experience of the poem such that they make the poetry appear more devout. But, since it is only the appearance of devoutness that matters, such inquiries are not strictly necessary; the actual devout-

ness of the poet is not an aesthetic concern. Nor does the reader have to share the religious convictions of the poet in order to enjoy the poetry, as some have thought. For, to repeat, the actual truth or worth of the feelings expressed are not at issue, although the poem makes it appear so.

Another way—Baldwin's way—of saying this is to say that the judgment of scientific possibility, or of religious devoutness, as with the earlier judgments in the Denver car park, are taken semblantly, that is, as appearances. For anything that is immediate is necessarily semblant, and vice versa.

In terms of levels of immediacy, then, we may say that all levels of aesthetic experience are immediate. But at the reflective level, it is richer because it is *funded* with more judgments, and those judgments are themselves more articulated and differentiated. It is also clearer, because the results of reflection are retained without destroying the immediacy. With this account of the richness and clarity of immediacy at the reflective level, we come full circle to Baldwin's notion of pancalism, because, of course, it is just these characters that lead him to claim for aesthetic experience the most comprehensive grasp of reality.

IV

Let us close with a few words summarizing the main achievements of Baldwin's work in the area of aesthetic development and its chief limitations.

First, and most importantly, he manages to conceive in a relevant and fruitful way a general scheme for the aesthetic development of the individual. He does this by focusing on aesthetic experience, which his knowledge of the philosophical tradition in aesthetics enables him to construe appropriately. This focus allows him to pick out for attention the developmental thread that most matters in connection with the arts, i.e., what is aesthetic. In so doing it brings together the creative, appreciative, and judgmental activities, and also generalizes across the various art forms. The selection of this focus is of fundamental importance in his work, and it seems that its significance has not been fully digested by the cognitive developmental movement since his time. The fact that no one since his time has come up with a usable alternative cognitive developmental scheme in the area of the arts and the aesthetic is a witness to this. In short, Baldwin helps us conceive a way to fill an obvious lacuna in the scope of cognitive-developmental theories.

A second achievement is the way in which his notions of aesthetic development are integrated into his general theory of the development of mind. The stages through which he believes the aesthetic experience of an individual passes are derived from both his observations of individuals (though he did not collect data systematically) and deduction from his general theory. Specifically, they are deduced from the levels of the development of the understanding of self, first the adualistic level, then the dualistic but not reflective level, lastly the dualistic and reflective level. There are not currently many candidates for the role of a theory which can integrate or relate together the various strands of cognitive development. Baldwin's success in establishing a relationship between stages of aesthetic experience and stages in the understanding of self lends further plausibility to the claim of his general theory to be integrative in a fashion much to be desired.

The third achievement is that Baldwin's account contains a fair amount of detail as to the character of the particular stages, and that what he says is not inconsistent with the data that have been collected since his time. One could even say that these data, such as they are, support his more general formulations. Beyond this, and perhaps more importantly, his work is detailed enough to serve as a guide to further empirical investigation. On the basis of his work, various specific hypotheses concerning the experience of particular arts could be derived and subjected to empirical test. This derivation would no doubt require some imagination on the part of the researcher if it is to be specific enough, but Baldwin's work abounds with suggestions. It could well serve as a springboard for further empirical work pursuing the aesthetic development of individuals, and it is to be hoped that it will do so.

As for the major limitations, three have been mentioned. The first is rather general and has to do with the brevity and difficulty of Baldwin's presentation. His writing is often tortuous and it is not always easy to figure out his intentions. He mixes technical and ordinary language without warning. Moreover, he does not take care to clarify concepts and does not use examples. Finally, his vocabulary is often very abstract; and he is allusive. His manner of writing makes it somewhat difficult for psychologists to use his ideas easily.

A second point is not unrelated. Baldwin has many different concerns in mind as he writes, and his attempt to discuss a number of different kinds of relationships as he goes results in a complex organization. Nowhere does he present as a separate story his account of the development of aesthetic experience, though it would seem very desirable to do so. In his work, this story is related to at least three other concerns: the parallels with scientific and moral development, the connections with the development of the self, and

the argument for pancalism. This latter is the dominant purpose of *Thought and Things* and *Genetic Theory of Reality* as explained at the beginning of this discussion. The topic is unquestionably important, but, whatever its merits, its presence is not helpful to psychologists interested in the lesser question concerning the development of aesthetic experience.

Last, there are at least two omissions in Baldwin's account which a more empirically oriented approach reveals. Baldwin does not discuss the points at which the character and qualities of the medium itself become significant in aesthetic experience, and the growing importance of formal arrangements of the elements of the medium. This is such an important aspect of mature aesthetic experience that its developmental history cannot reasonably be ignored. The other omission is of relativism with respect to aesthetic judgments. Relativism is more common in connection with aesthetic than with moral judgments, and there are probably psychological (as well as cultural) reasons for this, having to do with the dominant role of feelings as reasons for judgments. I agree with Baldwin that it is not the end-point of development (otherwise, I have argued, we could not properly speak of cognitive development in this connection). But it seems too common and too important to be ignored in a developmental account.

Of course, these deficiencies are minor compared with the achievements. The omissions mentioned are probably due to Baldwin's concern with the argument for pancalism and this concern illustrates what seems to be his dominant and most fruitful characteristics, when compared with contemporary psychology: the enormous reach of his ambition, the wide range of his knowledge and concerns, and the constant interplay between psychological and philosophical considerations in his work. It seems as if these characteristics were necessary if a theory of aesthetic development was to be initiated, and a revival of them on the contemporary scene would be welcome.

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